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1Letter from the  
Subcommittee Cochairs
As cochairs of the Pensions Subcommittee of the University 
of Pittsburgh Institute of Politics, we are pleased to release 
the attached report, What to Do about Municipal Pensions.   
Underfunded municipal pensions were a serious problem  
in Pennsylvania before the economic downturn of 2008; 
they now are part of what could become a spreading 
municipal financial crisis, especially in our cities. Various 
proposals have been advanced to address this growing 
concern. The recommendations presented in this report 
have been agreed upon by a wide variety of stakeholders. 
While the recommendations’ enactment would not solve  
all our pension problems, the fact that they achieved 
consensus support from our subcommittee should make 
them prime candidates for legislative consideration.
Since the initial release of our report early in 2009,  
various other legislative proposals have been introduced  
in the State House of Representatives and Senate. 
We want to thank the members of our subcommittee, 
who are identified in this report, for their participation and 
contributions. We hope that this report will contribute to 
constructive discussions of policy changes to municipal 
pensions in Pennsylvania.
 
  
Jane Orie Dan Frankel  
Member,  Member,  
Pennsylvania Senate Pennsylvania House  
 of Representatives 
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Introduction
Even before the precipitous market decline of late 2008, 
pension obligations were threatening the long-term fiscal 
stability of many municipalities. Urban centers with declining 
populations and unfavorable retiree-to-employee ratios—
such as Pittsburgh, where pension fund liabilities represent 
a big chunk of the city’s financial woes—have the most 
serious problems, but underfunded pension plans can be 
found in dozens of Pennsylvania municipalities of all sizes.
Budgetary pressures, longer life expectancies, and the 
state’s aging demographics have contributed to these 
pension problems. In addition, some local governments 
have incurred pension obligations in good economic times 
that become harder to sustain when the economy stalls 
and investment returns drop. The status of pension systems 
as contractual obligations to employees limits options for 
change; a defined retirement benefit promised to a 25-year-
old new hire today becomes an unbreakable financial 
obligation that could last far into the future.
In response to the growing awareness of municipal pension 
problems in Pennsylvania, the Fiscal Policy and Governance 
Committee of the University of Pittsburgh Institute of Politics 
formed the Pensions Subcommittee to gather information 
and consider policy options. The subcommittee, cochaired 
by State Representative Dan Frankel and State Senator Jane 
Orie, met 10 times from April 2007 through August 2008. 
Other subcommittee members were:
Henry Beukema, McCune Foundation
Daniel Booker, Reed Smith LLP
Patrick Browne, Pennsylvania State Senate
Richard Caponi, AFSCME, District Council 84
Brian Ellis, Pennsylvania House of Representatives
Angela Williams Foster, University of Pittsburgh
Christina Gabriel, the Heinz Endowments
William “Pat” Getty, Claude Worthington 
Benedum Foundation
Marva Harris, PNC Bank, retired
Brian Jensen, Pennsylvania Economy League 
of Southwestern Pennsylvania
Timothy Johnson, Allegheny County Department 
of Administrative Services
Gerri Kay, the Pittsburgh Foundation, retired
Joseph King, Pittsburgh Fire Fighters IAFF Local No. 1
Bernard Kozlowski, Public Employee Retirement 
Commission (PERC)
Scott Kunka, City of Pittsburgh Department of Finance
Michael Lamb, City of Pittsburgh Controller’s Office
Jeffrey Lewis, Heinz Family Philanthropies
Bill Lickert, Teamsters Local 205
Marick Masters, University of Pittsburgh
David Matter, Oxford Development Company
David Miller, University of Pittsburgh
Brian Parker, McGuire Woods LLP
In addition, James Allen of the Pennsylvania Municipal 
Retirement System; Paul Halliwell of PERC; staff of the 
Pennsylvania Department of the Auditor General; and  
Elliot Dinkin of Cowden Associates, Inc., an actuarial firm, 
served as resources to the subcommittee. Institute of Politics 
staff members Marie Hamblett, Moe Coleman, and Bruce 
Barron supported the subcommittee’s work.
The subcommittee completed a draft report in September 
2008. During fall 2008, the Institute of Politics conducted 
additional outreach to stakeholders, discussing the report’s 
five recommendations and their viability with municipal 
organizations, business representatives, executive branch 
staff, and others. The subcommittee recognizes that 
any legislation based on the recommendations in this 
report will undergo considerable debate and may require 
further amendment before it can achieve passage. The 
subcommittee also recognizes that, because of the current 
economic downturn, increased revenue from taxes on  
out-of-state companies’ insurance policies (required to  
fund the redistribution of state pension aid envisioned  
in recommendation three) may not materialize for some 
time. Nevertheless, after reviewing the feedback received, 
the subcommittee still considers its five recommendations  
to be sound. 
This report summarizes the subcommittee’s  
activity and recommendations.
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Background on  
the subcommittee
• Formed by the Fiscal Policy and Governance Committee   
 of the University of Pittsburgh Institute of Politics to   
 examine policy issues related to significant underfunding  
 of municipal pensions in Pennsylvania
• Cochaired by State Representative Dan Frankel and  
 State Senator Jane Orie, with membership from business,  
 labor, government, academia, and philanthropy
• Met 10 times from April 2007 through August 2008
Current status of municipal 
pension plans: Key issues
• Enormous number of separate local government  
 pension plans—more than 3,000, including more  
 than 2,500 municipal plans
• Inefficiency and high administrative costs, especially  
 in smaller plans
• Significant underfunding, most notably in, but by  
 no means limited to, large cities
• Underfunding as a long-term risk to municipalities’  
 ability to carry out necessary operations
• All but one State Senate district having at least  
 one underfunded plan
• Portability problem
• Wide variance in management: 800 plans managed  
 by the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System; 
 many others managed independently
• Substantial state funding (through tax on out-of-state  
 insurance policies sold in Pennsylvania) providing 
 full-cost reimbursement for hundreds of plans
How existing law  
addresses underfunding
• The Pennsylvania General Assembly became concerned  
 about growing unfunded pension liabilities in the 1970s  
 and 1980s.
• Act 205 of 1984, as amended, requires municipalities  
 to fulfill pension obligations on a 30-year amortization  
 plan (40 years for distressed municipalities).
• Public Employee Retirement Commission reviews plans  
 to verify that municipal contributions comply with  
 funding obligations.
• Pittsburgh and Philadelphia received relief from the  
 General Assembly in 1998, in the form of delayed  
 amortization plan, favorable accounting assumptions,  
 and bonding authority.
Key subcommittee findings
• It is easier to address the asset side of pension funds  
 (i.e., investment management) than the liability side  
 (pension benefits), as promised benefits represent an  
 inviolable commitment to employees.
• Municipalities and state legislators frequently face  
 political pressure to increase benefits. Conversely, it is  
 difficult to pass legislation delaying eligibility for pension  
 benefits, despite increases in life expectancy that lead  
 to higher pension expenditures.
• State pension aid is generous, but any attempt to  
 revise it to assist underfunded plans risks being  
 criticized as a bailout.
• Defined benefit (rather than defined contribution)  
 pension structures are required by state law for many  
 plans and preferred by labor.
• Consolidating plans is difficult because of the various  
 plans and their differing benefit structures; consolidating  
 the administration of plans is more achievable.
Executive Summary
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 Legislative options considered
 1. Continuing education for investment officers
 2. Consolidation of pension plans (several possible  
  approaches were discussed, including consolidation  
  with the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System  
  (PMRS), requiring underfunded and underperforming  
  plans to transfer their assets to state management,  
  or setting a timetable for mandatory consolidation  
  of plans depending on their size)
 3.  Altering the state pension aid formula
 4.  Fiduciary responsibility standards
 5.  Limiting benefit increases by already-underfunded 
  pension plans
 6.  Relationship between defined-contribution  
  and defined-benefit structures
 7. Application of overtime pay to final salary for pension  
  benefit purposes
 8. Adjusting formulas for calculating final salary
 9.  Changing rules governing retirement age
 10. Enforcing full funding of plan obligations more strictly
Legislative recommendations
 1. Continue education for investment officers
 2. Consolidate pension plan administration within PMRS
 3. Revise the state aid formula to freeze the unit cost  
  reimbursement at its current rate, require all plans  
  to pay a portion of pension costs, and place leftover  
  revenues in a pool for merit-based distribution to  
  distressed municipal plans
 4. Pass fiduciary responsibility legislation to hold profes- 
  sional advisors to a higher fiduciary standard, require  
  that fiduciaries be bonded, impose greater consistency  
  with regard to the assumptions made in actuarial reports,  
  require more detailed reporting from plans that are less  
  than 75 percent funded, and require municipalities to  
  make quarterly contributions to their plans rather than  
  end-of-year contributions
 5. Prohibit underfunded pension plans from increasing benefits
The Current Status of Municipal 
Pensions in Pennsylvania
Lots of plans. As of 2007, Pennsylvania had 3,160 separate 
pension plans, most of them very small (67 percent of them 
had 10 or fewer members). This number represents more 
than one-fourth of the nation’s public employee plans. Half 
of these plans were created after 1974. Of the 3,160 plans, 
2,536 are operated by municipalities, 491 by authorities, 72 
by counties, and 61 by councils of governments. Overall, 
Pennsylvania local government pension plans represented 
135,000 members and owned more than $18 billion in 
assets as of the publication of PERC’s 2007 Status Report.
Underfunding. There are perhaps 200 underfunded 
pension plans in Pennsylvania, depending on the criteria 
used. The Pennsylvania Economy League has prepared  
maps (see Appendix, Figure 1) identifying the plans that 
meet one of two criteria for severe underfunding: (1) the 
ratio of assets to liabilities is less than 70 percent or (2) 
unfunded liabilities exceed annual payroll. Using these 
criteria, all but one of Pennsylvania’s 50 State Senate  
districts contained at least one underfunded pension plan.
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Lack of efficiency and portability. The enormous number 
of separate pension plans creates costly inefficiencies.  
The smallest independently managed plans have significantly 
higher administrative costs per member (see Appendix, 
Figure 2). Moreover, police organizations have long com-
plained that the lack of a unified system prevents officers 
from taking their accumulated pension with them to a new 
job. Nevertheless, efforts to combine municipal pension 
plans have been largely unsuccessful.
Management. The experience and abilities of fund admin-
istrators vary widely. So do investment policies, as some 
plans pursue more risky investments in search of higher 
returns while others are conservative. More than 800 plans 
have chosen to invest their funds through the Pennsylvania 
Municipal Retirement System, but hundreds of others 
continue to manage their own portfolios.
Significant state funding. Since the passage of Act 205 
in 1984, municipal pension funds have received state aid 
financed by a tax on insurance policies sold in Pennsylvania 
by out-of-state companies. The total amount of state aid 
coming from this funding stream exceeds $200 million per 
year. Nearly half of the plans eligible for state aid receive 
full reimbursement of their pension costs, thereby removing 
municipalities’ motivation to control costs.
Although irresponsible management certainly has contrib-
uted to some of the municipal pension problems, demo-
graphic shifts also have played a role in the largest funding 
gaps. Whereas newly developed, growing suburbs have  
few retired workers to support, large cities with declining 
populations may have as many retirees as current employees 
(see Appendix, Figure 3). Their pension plans are paying  
out more money than they receive in current employee 
contributions, and their tax base is shrinking.
Many municipalities’ plans have become seriously under-
funded and have fallen into the undesirable practice of 
relying on current plan contributions to cover obligations 
to employees who have already retired, rather than fully 
funding employees’ actuarially anticipated benefits during 
the period of their active employment. Other causes of 
underfunding have included retroactive benefit increases, 
failure to comprehend the actual cost of benefit improvements, 
and too-hopeful investment performance assumptions.
During the 1970s, serious concerns arose regarding the 
extent to which municipal pension plans in Pennsylvania 
were becoming underfunded. By 1984, this underfunding 
had reached an estimated statewide total of $2.9 billion. 
When the General Assembly created the Public Employee 
Retirement Study Commission in 1981, it asked the commis-
sion to propose legislation that would address these funding 
deficiencies. In January 1983, the Commission responded 
with a report recommending the enactment of required 
actuarial funding standards to be applied to all plans.
In November 1984, the General Assembly enacted such 
standards as part of Act 205, requiring municipalities to 
make payments on a schedule that would address any 
underfunding within 30 years. It also created a state aid 
system that distributes available funds to municipalities 
based on their number of full-time employees, with each 
police officer or firefighter counting as two units and each 
nonuniformed employee as one unit. Act 205 offered  
some remedies to distressed municipalities, including a 
supplemental funding program (which expired in 2003)  
and the right to set up a 40-year rather than a 30-year 
funding schedule.
The Underfunding Problem and  
the General Assembly’s Response
7Purpose and Mission  
of the Subcommittee
At its outset, the Subcommittee recognized that reforming 
municipal pensions could be an important means of promoting 
government efficiency. The Subcommittee identified several 
prominent problems with the present system:
• Rising pension costs, making it increasingly difficult for  
 many municipalities with unfunded pension systems to  
 continue completing the other functions of government
• Lack of pension portability
• Administrative inefficiencies and disparities
• Deficiencies in the statutory framework 
 governing pensions
The subcommittee established two goals: (1) to develop 
a series of pragmatic policy recommendations to address 
these problems and (2) to propose ways to educate 
Pennsylvanians about the problem.
Under Act 205, the Department of the Auditor General is 
responsible for certifying accuracy of employee unit counts 
and for calculating disbursement of state aid. Each munici-
pality is responsible for calculating, with the assistance of 
an actuary, the minimum municipal obligation (MMO) that 
must be budgeted each year to fulfill the fund’s amortiza-
tion schedule. The Public Employee Retirement Commission 
(PERC) is responsible for verifying that municipalities are 
making the appropriate contribution. PERC analyzes the 
data submitted by municipal pension plans every two years, 
advises municipalities and the auditor general’s office of 
funding deficiencies, and publishes these deficiencies in its 
biennial Status Reports. According to PERC’s 2007 Status 
Report, the prevalence of funding deficiencies has declined 
substantially since the enactment of Act 205; this report 
found noncompliance with the actuarial funding standard 
in 74 municipal plans, or less than 4 percent of the 2,228 
defined benefit municipal plans in existence at that time.
In 1998, the General Assembly granted additional flexibility 
to both Pittsburgh and Philadelphia by way of amendments 
to Act 205. Pittsburgh was permitted to restart its amor-
tization as of 1998, on a new 40-year timetable and with 
the assumption of a 10 percent interest rate. Philadelphia 
received a new 30-year amortization timetable and  
bonding authority.
As of the publication of PERC’s 2007 Status Report, the 
unfunded liabilities of Pennsylvania’s municipal pension 
plans totaled approximately $6.8 billion.
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7Limitations on the Subcommittee’s 
Scope of Work
The subcommittee’s focus on finding pragmatic solutions  
to municipal pension problems meant that it did not focus 
on several other areas:
• The subcommittee examined only municipal pensions, 
 not county, state, or public school employee pensions.
• The subcommittee did not deal with retiree health care  
 costs, which ultimately could pose an even more serious  
 fiscal problem at the municipal level than pensions.
• The subcommittee looked for policy solutions that could  
 achieve support from a broad consensus of stakeholders  
 and that thereby have a reasonable chance of passage.  
 Thus, for example, the subcommittee did not review  
 the provisions in Act 111 of 1968 that govern binding  
 arbitration for municipal employees. Some organizations  
 have expressed dissatisfaction with these provisions,  
 but altering them would be difficult except in special  
 cases such as when a municipality is distressed  
 (as already provided under Act 47 of 1987, as amended)  
 or when a pension plan is seriously underfunded  
 (as envisioned in recommendation five of this report).
Subcommittee Activities
The subcommittee received various presentations on 
issues related to municipal pension policy and directed 
Institute of Politics staff members to research policy options 
implemented across the country. From this research, the 
subcommittee generated a set of 10 possible policy options; 
obtained input on these policy options from various stake-
holder groups, including municipal organizations and labor 
unions; and drew on this input in developing a list of policy 
recommendations.
Key Facts
The subcommittee engaged in lengthy and extensive policy 
discussions. (Meeting summaries and policy analyses 
prepared for the subcommittee are available on request.) 
Along the way, important considerations guiding the  
subcommittee to its policy recommendations included  
the following:
• Ways to address underfunding problems fall into two  
 basic categories: increasing assets and decreasing liabilities.
• Of these two, the liability side is the much harder one  
 to address, as pension benefits promised to all current  
 employees are inviolable. Benefit changes can be applied  
 only to employees hired after the changes take place.
• Municipal and state officials generally face greater  
 political pressure to increase employee benefits than  
 to constrain them.
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• The state pension aid formula is very generous, providing  
 full cost reimbursement to hundreds of plans, including  
 many in newer, financially healthy suburbs with modest  
 legacy costs. However, any attempt to redistribute state  
 funds will face strong opposition, particularly to the  
 extent that it is seen as a bailout of municipalities that  
 failed to fund their pension plans responsibly.
• Municipal pension structures take into consideration  
 that many municipal employees have physically  
 demanding and (for police and firefighters) hazardous  
 jobs. In addition, some municipal employees do not  
 participate in Social Security.
• Act 205 already contains suitable provisions to require  
 municipalities to eliminate unfunded liabilities, although  
 the General Assembly has granted significant exceptions  
 to Pittsburgh and Philadelphia.
• Defined-contribution plans (under which the employer  
 places a certain amount of money each month in active  
 employees’ pension accounts) have more predictable  
 fiscal obligations than defined-benefit plans (under  
 which retirees are guaranteed a certain monthly  
 payment, based on salary level and longevity of  
 employment, from retirement until death). However,  
 defined-benefit plans better fulfill the original purpose  
 of pension plans (to provide retirement security) and  
 are preferred by labor.
• Despite increasing life expectancies, it is difficult to enact  
 legislation that would raise the retirement age or tighten  
 eligibility requirements for retirement.
• Consolidating existing pension plans is onerous because   
 the plans contain different benefit structures that cannot  
 be altered for present employees. However, it is possible   
 to consolidate administration of pension plans without   
 consolidating benefit structures.
Options Reviewed
The subcommittee considered the following policy areas in 
its review:
 1. Continuing education for investment officers
 2. Consolidation of pension plans (several possible  
  approaches were discussed, including consolidation with 
  the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System, requiring 
  underfunded and underperforming plans to transfer  
  their assets to state management, or setting a timetable  
  for mandatory consolidation of plans depending on  
  their size)
 3. The state pension aid formula
 4. Fiduciary responsibility standards
 5. Limiting benefit increases by already-underfunded  
  pension plans
 6. Relationship between defined-contribution and defined- 
  benefit structures
 7. Application of overtime pay to final salary for pension  
  benefit purposes
 8. Formula for calculating final salary
 9. Rules governing retirement age
 10. Enforcing full funding of plan obligations more strictly
The subcommittee determined that it could not make viable 
recommendations for policy change in areas 6 through 9. 
With regard to defined-contribution vs. defined-benefit 
plans (area 6), subcommittee members did not reach 
consensus but recognized the need to balance labor’s 
concerns for pension security with municipalities’ concerns 
for controlling costs. Several members of the subcommittee 
intend to continue pursuing policy options in this area.
The subcommittee further determined that existing legisla-
tion is sufficient to result in full funding of plan obligations 
(policy area 10), provided that state agencies continue to 
enforce adherence to MMOs and that the General Assembly 
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does not continue to grant generous loopholes such as 
the relief given to Pittsburgh and Philadelphia in 1998. 
Accordingly, the subcommittee’s recommendations focus on 
the first five of the policy areas listed. (These recommenda-
tions are presented in the order in which the subcommittee 
reviewed them, not in order of priority.)
Recommendations
1. Continuing education for investment officers. 
The subcommittee believes it is reasonable to expect that 
those responsible for managing local governments’ invest-
ment decisions be properly trained. Therefore, it proposes 
requiring each local government to designate an “investment 
officer” and requiring municipal treasurers and investment 
officers to receive at least six hours a year of continuing 
education on investment responsibilities. This training also 
should cover GASB 43 and 45, the accounting standards 
adopted in 2004 that cover accounting and financial 
reporting of other post-employment benefits (OPEB)  
offered by government employers and their benefit plans.
2. Consolidation of local government pension plans  
within the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System 
(PMRS). Most of the arguments for consolidation of local 
government plans are actually calls for administrative 
consolidation, not necessarily for standardization of benefits. 
Accordingly, the desired policy goals, such as portability and 
administrative efficiency,  could be achieved by consolidating 
asset administration (but not benefit structures) through the 
transition of all plans to PMRS management. PMRS already 
administers hundreds of plans with different benefit structures 
and, should the state mandate consolidation, would be the 
logical vehicle to manage the plans. 
The subcommittee believes that such a consolidation could 
proceed more smoothly if implemented incrementally— 
e.g., incorporating all plans with fewer than 10 employees 
over the first three years, then plans of 10–20 employees, 
and completing the consolidation over a 12-year period.
Currently, a municipality wishing to place its plan under 
PMRS management must receive approval from 75 percent 
of its employees, so a mandatory statewide consolidation 
within PMRS would require a change of this policy.
PMRS currently awards member plans a regular interest rate 
of 6 percent each year, plus an excess interest dividend in 
years when investment performance provides a sufficient 
surplus. In years where PMRS awards excess interest 
dividends, it may be desirable to enact a requirement that 
municipalities with seriously underfunded pension plans 
must use the dividend to reduce unfunded liability, not 
to provide additional benefits to plan members, until the 
pension plan attains a minimum funding ratio of at least  
80 percent (see recommendation five below) and is on a 
clear path to reaching a 100 percent funded ratio.
Some municipalities with fully funded, effectively managed 
plans may object to consolidation. The subcommittee 
believes an opt-out provision for plans that are fully funded 
and that have achieved long-term returns comparable to 
those of PMRS would certainly be appropriate.
3. State aid formula revision. The subcommittee recom-
mends the following changes to the provisions governing 
state aid to municipal pensions: 
• Require all local governments to pay a portion of their   
 pension plan costs. 
• Freeze the unit cost reimbursement at the current   
 amount, which was $3,186 in 2008.
In the event that insurance revenue drops, the unit cost 
reimbursement should be recalculated and set at a new, 
lower amount. However, it should not be increased for  
a defined period of five or 10 years.
The extra funds generated by holding the unit cost reimburse- 
ment rate steady as insurance revenue increases could be 
placed in a pool for distribution to distressed municipalities. 
Reimbursement could be based on a formula that accounts 
for factors such as local financial participation, investment 
performance, or responsible management practices. 
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Municipalities that have substantial obligations to retired 
workers but whose reimbursement amount is dropping due 
to cuts in the current workforce could be considered for 
supplemental assistance.
4. Fiduciary responsibility legislation. The subcommittee 
recommends that the General Assembly consider enacting 
several measures that would enhance the level of fiduciary 
responsibility required of pension plans and their managers. 
Such measures include: 
• Holding professional advisors of municipal pension plans  
 to a higher fiduciary standard; 
• Requiring that pension plan fiduciaries be bonded; 
• Imposing greater consistency upon the assumptions 
 made in actuarial valuation reports, so as to permit more  
 uniform identification of pension plans’ funding ratios  
 or the impact of proposed benefit increases;
• Requiring plans that are less than 75 percent funded  
 to report in greater detail on their obligations to retirees;  
• Requiring municipal contributions to pension plans on  
 a quarterly rather than an end-of-year basis.
5. Prohibit underfunded plans from increasing benefits. 
The subcommittee recommends that Pennsylvania follow 
Missouri’s example by enacting legislation that prohibits 
municipalities from authorizing pension benefit increases 
unless their pension plan would be at least 80 percent funded 
after taking the increased liability into account. Such a  
provision would prevent municipalities still catching up on prior 
underfunding of plans from approving further benefits that 
they could not easily afford. 
Educating the Public on Pension Needs
It is difficult to engage the general public in discussions of 
municipal pensions. Beyond the pension beneficiaries them-
selves, municipal governments, labor organizations, public 
agencies (such as the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement 
System, Public Employees Retirement Commission, and state 
employee retirement systems), and professional actuaries are 
the only direct stakeholders; others are concerned only to 
the extent that public pension costs may affect their taxes  
or seriously impair government operations.
The subcommittee encourages ongoing public outreach 
(using this report and perhaps other communication 
tools) to build support for policy actions that would make 
Pennsylvania’s municipal pension system more sustainable.
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Figure 1:  Pennsylvania Economy League pension distress maps
NOTE: Figures 1a–1d show the location of underfunded pension plans by Pennsylvania State Senate and State House districts  
as of 2007. The lists of legislators have been updated to reflect the 2008 election. 
Figure 2: Per Member Administrative Cost for Selected Municipal Pension Plans Based on Pension Plan Size
Figure 3: Ratio of Active Members to Beneficiaries 
Appendices
Figure 1a: Allegheny County State Senate Districts
37 Pippy, John (R)  
38 Ferlo, Jim (D)  
40 Orie, Jane Clare (R)
42 Fontana, Wayne D. (D)
Allegheny County State Senate Districts:
43 Costa, Jay (D)  
45 Logan, Sean (D)  
46 Stout, J. Barry (D)  
47 Vogel, Elder A., Jr. (R) 
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Figure 1b: Allegheny County State House Districts
16 Matzie, Robert F. (D) 
19 Wheatley, Jake (D) 
20 Walko, Don (D) 
21 Costa, Dom (D) 
22 Wagner, Chelsa (D) 
23 Frankel, Dan (D) 
24 Preston, Joseph, Jr. (D) 
25 Markosek, Joseph F. (D) 
27 Deasy, Daniel J. (D) 
28 Turzai, Mike (R) 
30 Vulakovich, Randy (R) 
32 DeLuca, Anthony M. (D) 
33 Dermody, Frank (D) 
34 Costa, Paul (D) 
35  Gergely, Marc J. (D) 
36  Readshaw, Harry (D) 
38  Kortz, II, William C. (D) 
39  Levdansky, David K. (D) 
40  Maher, John (R) 
42  Smith, Matthew (D) 
44  Mustio, T. Mark (R) 
45  Kotik, Nick (D) 
46  White, Jesse (D) 
Allegheny County State House Districts
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Figure 1c: Pennsylvania State Senate Districts 
 1 Farnese, Lawrence M., Jr. (D) 
 2 Tartaglione, Christine M. (D) 
 3 Kitchen, Shirley M. (D) 
 4 Washington, Leanna M. (D) 
 5 Stack, Michael J. (D) 
 6 Tomlinson, Robert M. (R) 
 7 Hughes, Vincent J. (D) 
 8 Williams, Anthony H. (D) 
 9 Pileggi, Dominic (R) 
10 McIlhinney, Charles T., Jr. (R) 
11 O'Pake, Michael A. (D) 
12 Greenleaf, Stewart J. (R) 
13 Smucker, Lloyd K. (R) 
14 Musto, Raphael J. (D) 
15 Piccola, Jeffrey E. (R) 
16 Browne, Patrick M. (R) 
17 Leach, Daylin (D) 
18 Boscola, Lisa M. (D) 
19 Dinniman, Andrew E. (D) 
20 Baker, Lisa (R)  
21 White, Mary Jo (R) 
22 Mellow, Robert J. (D) 
23 Yaw, Gene (R) 
24 Wonderling, Robert C. (R) 
25 Scarnati, Joseph B., III (R) 
26 Erickson, Edwin B. (R) 
27 Gordner, John R. (R) 
28 Waugh, Michael L. (R) 
29 Argall, David G. (R) 
30 Eichelberger, John H. (R) 
31 Vance, Patricia H. (R) 
32 Kasunic, Richard A (D) 
33 Alloway, Richard L., II (R) 
34 Corman, Jake (R) 
35 Wozniak, John N. (D) 
36 Brubaker, Michael W. (R) 
37 Pippy, John (R) 
38 Ferlo, Jim (D) 
39 Ward, Kim L. (R) 
40 Orie, Jane Clare (R) 
41 White, Donald C. (R) 
42 Fontana, Wayne D. (D) 
43 Costa, Jay (D) 
44 Rafferty, John C., Jr. (R) 
45 Logan, Sean (D) 
46 Stout, J. Barry (D) 
47 Vogel, Elder A., Jr. (R) 
48 Folmer, Mike (R) 
49 Earll, Jane M. (R) 
50 Robbins, Robert D. (R)
Pennsylvania State Senate Districts 
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Figure 1d: Pennsylvania State House Districts 
 1 Harkins, Patrick J. (D)  
 2 Fabrizio, Florindo J. (D)  
 3 Hornaman, John (D)  
 4 Sonney, Curtis G. (R)  
 5 Evans, John R. (R)  
 6 Roae, Brad (R)  
 7 Longietti, Mark (D)  
 8 Stevenson, Richard R. (R)  
 9 Sainato, Chris (D)  
10 Gibbons, Jaret (D)  
11 Ellis, Brian L. (R)  
12 Metcalfe, Daryl D. (R)  
13 Houghton, Tom (D)  
14 Marshall, Jim (R)  
15 Christiana, Jim (R)  
16 Matzie, Robert F. (D)  
17 Brooks, Michele (R)  
18 DiGirolamo, Gene (R)  
19 Wheatley, Jake (D)  
20 Walko, Don (D)  
21 Costa, Dom (D)  
22 Wagner, Chelsa (D)  
23 Frankel, Dan (D)  
24 Preston, Joseph, Jr. (D)  
25 Markosek, Joseph F. (D)  
26 Hennessey, Tim (R)  
27 Deasy, Daniel J. (D)  
28 Turzai, Mike (R)  
29 O'Neill, Bernie (R)  
30 Vulakovich, Randy (R)  
31 Santarsiero, Steven J. (D)  
32 DeLuca, Anthony M. (D)  
33 Dermody, Frank (D)  
34 Costa, Paul (D)  
35 Gergely, Marc J. (D)  
36 Readshaw, Harry (D)  
37 Creighton, Tom C. (R)  
38 Kortz, William C., II (D)  
39 Levdansky, David K. (D)  
40 Maher, John (R)  
41 True, Katie (R)  
42 Smith, Matthew (D)  
43 Boyd, Scott W. (R)  
44 Mustio, T. Mark (R)  
45 Kotik, Nick (D)  
46 White, Jesse (D)  
47 Gillespie, Keith (R)  
48 Solobay, Timothy J. (D)  
49 Daley, Peter J. (D)  
50 DeWeese, H. William (D)
51 Mahoney, Tim (D)  
52 Kula, Deberah (D)  
53 Godshall, Robert W. (R)  
54 Pallone, John E. (D)  
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 55 Petrarca, Joseph A. (D)  
 56 Casorio, James E. (D)  
 57 Krieger, Tim (R)  
 58 Harhai, R. Ted (D)  
 59 Reese, Mike (R)  
 60 Pyle, Jeffrey P. (R)  
 61 Harper, Kate (R)  
 62 Reed, Dave (R)  
 63 Oberlander, Donna (R)  
 64 Hutchinson, Scott E. (R)  
 65 Rapp, Kathy L. (R)  
 66 Smith, Samuel H. (R)  
 67 Causer, Martin T. (R)  
 68 Baker, Matthew E. (R)  
 69 Metzgar, Carl Walker (R)  
 70 Bradford, Matthew D. (D)  
 71 Barbin, Bryan (D)  
 72 Burns, Frank (D)  
 73 Haluska, Gary (D)  
 74 George, Camille Bud (D)  
 75 Gabler, Matt (R)  
 76 Hanna, Michael K. (D)  
 77 Conklin, H. Scott (D)  
 78 Hess, Dick L. (R)  
 79 Geist, Richard A. (R)  
 80 Stern, Jerry (R)  
 81 Fleck, Mike (R)  
 82 Harris, C. Adam (R)  
 83 Mirabito, Rick (D)  
 84 Everett, Garth D. (R)  
 85 Fairchild, Russell H. (R)  
 86 Keller, Mark K. (R)  
 87 Grell, Glen R. (R)  
 88 DeLozier, Sheryl M. (R)  
 89 Kauffman, Rob W. (R)  
 90 Rock, Todd (R)  
 91 Moul, Dan (R)  
 92 Perry, Scott (R)  
 93 Miller, Ron (R)  
 94 Saylor, Stan (R)  
 95 DePasquale, Eugene (D)  
 96 Sturla, P. Michael (D)  
 97 Bear, John C. (R)  
 98 Hickernell, David S. (R)  
 99 Denlinger, Gordon (R)  
100 Cutler, Bryan (R)  
101 Gingrich, Mauree (R)  
102 Swanger, RoseMarie (R)  
103 Buxton, Ron (D)  
104 Helm, Susan C. (R)  
105 Marsico, Ron (R)  
106 Payne, John D. (R)  
107 Belfanti, Robert E., Jr. (D)  
108 Phillips, Merle H. (R)  
109 Millard, David R. (R)  
110 Pickett, Tina (R)  
111 Major, Sandra (R)  
112 Smith, Ken (D)  
113 Murphy, Kevin P. (D)  
114 Wansacz, James (D)  
115 Staback, Edward G. (D)  
116 Eachus, Todd A. (D)  
117 Boback, Karen (R)  
118 Carroll , Mike (D)  
119 Yudichak, John T. (D)  
120 Mundy, Phyllis (D)  
121 Pashinski, Eddie Day (D)  
122 McCall, Keith R. (D)  
123 Goodman, Neal (D)  
124 Knowles, Jerry (R)  
125 Seip, Tim (D)  
126 Santoni, Dante, Jr. (D)  
127 Caltagirone, Thomas R. (D)  
128 Rohrer, Sam (R)  
129 Cox, Jim (R)  
130 Kessler, David R. (D)  
131 Beyer, Karen D. (R)  
132 Mann, Jennifer (D)  
133 Brennan, Joseph F. (D)  
134 Reichley, Douglas G. (R)  
135 Samuelson, Steve (D)  
136 Freeman, Robert (D)  
137 Grucela, Richard T. (D)  
138 Dally, Craig A. (R)  
139 Peifer, Michael (R)  
140 Galloway, John T. (D)  
141 Melio, Anthony J. (D)  
142 Farry, Frank A. (R)  
143 Quinn, Marguerite (R)  
144 Watson, Katharine M. (R)  
145 Clymer, Paul I. (R)  
146 Quigley, Thomas J. (R)  
147 Mensch, Bob (R)  
148 Gerber, Michael (D)  
149 Briggs, Tim (D)  
150 Vereb, Mike (R)
151 Taylor, Rick (D)  
152 Murt, Thomas P. (R)  
153 Shapiro, Josh (D)  
154 Curry, Lawrence H. (D)  
155 Schroder, Curt (R)  
156 McIlvaine Smith, Barbara (D)  
157 Drucker, Paul J. (D)  
158 Ross, Chris (R)  
159 Kirkland, Thaddeus (D)  
160 Barrar, Stephen (R)  
161 Lentz, Bryan R. (D)  
162 Miccarelli, Nick (R)  
163 Micozzie, Nicholas A. (R)  
164 Civera, Jr., Mario J. (R)  
165 Adolph, William F., Jr. (R)  
166 Vitali, Greg (D)  
167 Milne, Duane (R)  
168 Killion, Thomas H. (R)  
169 O’Brien, Dennis M. (R)  
170 Boyle, Brendan F. (D)  
171 Benninghoff, Kerry A. (R)  
172 Perzel, John M. (R)  
173 McGeehan, Michael P. (D)  
174 Sabatina, John P., Jr. (D)  
175 O’Brien, Michael H. (D)  
176 Scavello, Mario M. (R)  
177 Taylor, John (R)  
178 Petri, Scott A. (R)  
179 Payton, Tony J., Jr. (D)  
180 Cruz, Angel (D)  
181 Thomas, W. Curtis (D)  
182 Josephs, Babette (D)  
183 Harhart, Julie (R)  
184 Keller, William F. (D)  
185 Donatucci, Robert C. (D)  
186 Johnson, Kenyatta J. (D)  
187 Day, Gary (R)  
188 Roebuck, James R., Jr. (D)  
189 Siptroth, John J. (D)  
190 Brown, Vanessa Lowery (D)  
191 Waters, Ronald G. (D)  
192 Bishop, Louise Williams (D)  
193 Tallman, Will (R)  
194 Manderino, Kathy (D)  
195 Oliver, Frank Louis (D)  
196 Grore, Seth M. (R)  
197 Williams, Jewell (D)  
198 Youngblood, Rosita C. (D)  
199 Gabig, Will (R)  
200 Parker, Cherelle L. (D)  
201 Myers, John (D)  
202 Cohen, Mark B. (D)  
203 Evans, Dwight (D)
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Figure 2: Per Member Administrative Cost for Selected Municipal 
Pension Plans Based on Pension Plan Size
 Pension Plan Size Per Member Administrative Cost
 10 or Fewer Active Members $1,519.86
 11 to 100 Active Members $1,002.99
 More Than 100 Active Members $362.76
 More Than 500 Active Members $302.74
Source: PERC Status Report on Local Government Pension Plans, December 2008, page 6
Figure 3: Ratio of Active Members to Beneficiaries 
Ratio
 Cities 1:1.2
 Boroughs 1:0.5
 First Class Townships 1:0.5
 Second Class Townships 1:0.3
Source: Presentation to Institute of Politics Pensions Subcommittee by Allegheny Conference on Community Development, 
April 2007
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